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Abstract
Experimental economists have discovered various violations of ex-
pected utility theory and offered alternative models that can explain
laboratory results. This study discovers a new violation in risky choices
that cannot be explained by theories like Prospect Theory, Disappoint-
ment or Regret Theory. In an experimental setting using a between-
subject design, the influence of a dominated alternative on certainty
equivalents is shown. One group of subjects was offered a series of
choices between a lottery ticket with a 50-50 chance of winning and a
sure payoff. A second group was offered the same choice plus a third
alternative, that as it turned out was not chosen by any participant.
As a result, the average chosen sure payoff in the second group was
higher than in the first group. That means, by adding a dominated
alternative to a choice set, the certainty equivalent of a lottery is in-
creased.
1 Introduction
Since the beginning experimental economists provided results that show vio-
lations of Expected Utility Theory triggering the development of adaptations
such as Prospect Theory and new more intuitive models such as Disappoint-
ment or Regret Theory. Nonetheless, in real world business settings most
of the violations of the axiomatic structure Expected Utility Theory are not
considered very relevant and decision support systems still use tools based
on that theory. This paper reports experimental results that violate the very
core of the known theories by showing that adding a dominated alternative
to choice set can change decisions. From the experiment reported in this pa-
per one can argue that people do not have consistent underlying preferences.
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Therefore, this violation does not only challenge existing theory, but does
have implications for most real world business settings.
The theory of rational choice claims that individuals have underlying pref-
erences. However, when eliciting those preferences participants in laboratory
experiments show violations of the axiomatic structure of expected utility
theory. The theory of rational choice is based on two fundamental axioms,
which are independence and transitivity. So far, a variety of violations of
these axioms is reported in the literature and diverse models are offered to
explain laboratory findings. Following a recent suggestion of modelling util-
ity function with reference to the task at hand (Köszegi & Rabin, 2007), this
paper explores basic decisions between prospects. Experimental results are
reported that raise doubt about whether individuals have a consistent set of
underlying preferences.
In the following passage a variety of such violations are discussed and
possible solutions provided in economic literature mentioned. A known vio-
lation of the independence axiom is the common ratio effect (Allais, 1952),
showing that the choice between two lotteries does depend on the scaling of
the problem. Solutions to this violation are provided by the Machina triangle
(Machina, 1982) by introducing fanning out utility functions and prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) introducing a weighting function over
probabilities, stating an overestimation of low probabilities.
The axiom of transitivity is also found to be violated as described by the
Allais Paradox (Allais, 1952). The violation describes the change of pref-
erences after probabilities were lowered while relation between payoffs and
probabilities of winnings remain the same. This effect is also accommodated
by the weighting of probabilities in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979).
A different violation of transitivity has been observed in a form that
is known as preference reversals (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971). The viola-
tion was interpreted by differences in mental processes of choosing between
alternatives and the valuation (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983). Further obser-
vations of the phenomenon (Loomes et al., 1991) were not accommodated by
this explanation, could, however, be explained by regret theory (Loomes &
Sugden, 1982). The most recent attempt to explain preference reversals was
by imprecision (Loomes & Butler, 2007), however, the explanation fails to
accommodate the violation discovered in this paper.
Another form of violation of the axioms of utility theory is the change of
risk preferences for negative prospects, which means, while people tend to be
risk averse for positive payoffs, they are risk seeking for negative payoffs (Fish-
burn & Kochenberger, 1979). This violation has also been accommodated
by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). To avoid the influence of
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this effect, only prospects with positive payoffs were analysed in this paper.
Additionally inconsistencies in preferences occur when components of al-
ternatives are disregarded by decision-makers because they focus on compo-
nents that distinguish alternatives (Tversky, 1972). Prospect theory claims
that the inconsistencies are caused by an editing phase in the decision, where
problems are processed in a person's mind before alternatives are evaluated.
All the models mentioned above have one assumption in common, which is
that individuals have consistent underlying preferences (Cubitt et al., 2001).
While there is growing evidence of violations of transitivity, this paper chal-
lenges the assumption of the existence of such underlying preferences. With
consistent underlying preferences, one has to assume that adding a third al-
ternative to a set of choices that is dominated by the two previous choices
could not have an effect on the certainty equivalent of another lottery. That
means, if A  B  C the CE of A has to be the same whether C is offered
or not. This paper will show that adding an alternative C to a set of choices
alters the CE of A.
In order to design laws to protect individuals from poor choices in the
result of false consultation by financial agents and to provide financial institu-
tions with instruments to discover their clients' needs one has to understand
the processes of choice in the human mind. The question therefore is, what
the point of consumer protection is if preferences are altered by introducing
irrelevant alternatives.
2 Experiment
The group of participants consisted of 186 students from the Otto-von-
Guericke University Magdeburg matched randomly to five different groups.
The experiment was conducted in a laboratory environment.
Session 1 (18 participants) consisted of two steps. First the participants
were shown a table with two lottery tickets on it, Lottery A {0.5, 1'000;
0.5, 0} and Lottery B {p, 5'000; 1-p, 0}. The participants were asked to
determine a p for which it did not matter to them, which of the two lotteries
they would receive. In order to pay this choice the experimenter drew a ball
from a bingo cage labelled with probabilities 1%, 2%, 3%, ..., 100%. If the
ball indicated a probability smaller than the p chosen by the participants
Lottery A was paid. If the ball indicated a probability equal to the p chosen
by the participant the toss of a coin determined which lottery was played and
if the ball indicated a probability larger than the p chosen by the participant,
Lottery B was played with the p being the probability drawn from the bingo
cage.
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In the second step they were shown another table with the two lottery
tickets A and B (with p being the probability chosen by the participants
in the step before) and a sure payoff X. Only one of the lotteries could be
received but the participants did not know which one. They were asked
to determine a sure payoff X for which it did not matter to them whether
they would receive the sure payoff X or one of the lotteries. Although the
first step ensured that the participants were indifferent between the lotteries,
they still had the chance to indicate two values for X in the case this value
depended on which lottery would be laying next to it. However, none of the
participants chose to give two values for X. For the payment of this choice
the experimenter drew a ball from a bingo cage with balls labelled with
money values 1 Euro, 2 Euro, 3 Euro, ..., 5'000 Euro. If the ball indicated
a money value smaller than the X chosen by the participants one of the
lotteries was paid. If the ball indicated a money value equal to the X chosen
by the participant the toss of a coin determined whether one of the lotteries
was played or the participant received the money value X, and if the ball
indicated a money value larger than the X chosen by the participant, the
sure money value on the ball was paid.
Session 2 (20 participants) was similar, but this group only performed
step 2 and only Lottery A and the sure payoff X was offered. That means,
the choice was reduced by the Lottery B, which is a second lottery which the
participants did not prefer over Lottery A due to the procedure in step 1.
The payment procedure was the same as in step 2 of session 1.
Session 3 (29 participants) consisted of 13 choices between three alter-
natives, Lottery A {0.5, 1'000; 0.5, 0}, Lottery B {0.1, 5'000; 0.9, 0}, and
a sure payoff S (with S = 200...440). The procedure is similar to (Holt &
Laury, 2002). The participants indicated for each choice their preferred alter-
native by crossing the alternative they preferred. Also, they could indicate
indifference between two alternatives by crossing the two alternatives they
preferred over the third and indifference between all alternatives by crossing
all of them.
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3 Alternatives 2 Alternatives
Table Session 1 Session 2
Step 1
Lottery A: {.5,1'000,.5,0} Lottery: {.5,1'000,.5,0}
Lottery B: {p,5'000,(1-p),0} Money value: X
Task: Determine a p, Task: Determine an X,
for which it does not for which it does not
matter to you, which matter to you, whether
of the alternatives you receive the lottery
you receive or the sure money
Step 2
Lottery: A or B
Money value: X
Task: Determine an X
for which it does not
matter to you whether
you receive one of the
lotteries or the sure
money
Paired Session 3 Session 4
Choices Step 1
Lottery A: {.5,1'000,.5,0} Lottery: {.5,1'000,.5,0}
Lottery B: {.1,5'000,.9,0} Money value: X
Money Value: S
(with S = 200...400)
Task: 13 choices between Task: 13 choices between
A, B, and S A and S
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Table Session 5 Session 6
(small) Step 1
Lottery A: {.5,10,.5,0} Lottery: {.5,10,.5,0}
Lottery B: {p,50,(1-p),0} Money value: X
Task: Determine a p, Task: Determine an X,
for which it does not for which it does not
matter to you, which matter to you, whether
of the alternatives you receive the lottery
you receive or the sure money
Step 2
Lottery: A or B
Money value: X
Task: Determine an X
for which it does not
matter to you, whether
you receive one of the
lotteries or the sure
money
Paired Session 7 Session 8
Choices Step 1
(small) Lottery A: {.5,20,.5,0} Lottery: {.5,20,.5,0}
Lottery B: {.1,100,.9,0} Money value: X
Money Value: S
(with S = 2.00...8.80)
Task: 13 choices between Task: 13 choices between
A, B, and S A and S
Session 9
Lottery A: {.5,20,.5,0}
Lottery B: {.1,4,.9,0}
Money Value: S
(with S = 2.00..8.8)
Task: 13 choices between
A, B, and S
Table 1: Treatments
Session 4 (19 participants) consisted of the same mechanism as session 3,
but without Lottery B leaving only the lottery {0.5, 1'000; 0.5, 0} and a sure
payoff S (with S = 200...440).
For all participants in all sessions the decisions were about real money
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depending on a condition. For each participant the experimenter placed a bet
of 5 Euro on the number 19 of an American-Roulette-Table at the Casino in
Magdeburg. If that bet won it paid 35 to 1 and all the winnings were placed
on the number 23. If both bets won it paid 35 x 35 x 5 Euro = 6'125 Euro. In
this case one of the choices of that participant became real. For participants
in session 1 the toss of a coin determined which one of the choices was paid
and for participants in sessions 3 and 4 the experimenter drew a ball from a
bingo cage containing 13 balls numbered from 1 to 13. The number of the
ball determined which choice was paid.
In sessions 5 (17 participants) and 6 (19 participants) the choices of ses-
sions 1 and 2 were repeated, but with smaller sums of money. The lotteries
offered had possible payoffs of 50 and 10 Euro. For each participant the one
choice was paid at the end of the session without the dependence on winning
in the Casino. Furthermore, tasks from sessions 3 and 4 were repeated in
sessions 7 (14 participants) and 8 (19 participants). This time with lotteries
{0.1,100;0.9,0} and {0.5,20;0.5,0}.
The final session 9 (29 participants) was similar to session 7, but alterna-
tive B was exchanged for a different lottery. In that session we offered lottery
{0.1, 4, 0.9, 0}, which is clearly dominated by both of the other alternatives
since both payoff and probability of receiving a positive payoff are lower.
3 Results
In sessions 1, 2, 5 and 6 the CE was elicited by giving the participants
a choice between two lotteries and asking for a probability of winning for
which it did not matter for them which of the lotteries they would receive.
Following the procedure applied, the participants were indifferent between
the lotteries for the probability of winning in alternative B. Since none of
the participants chose to provide different money values it can be concluded
that they were indifferent between the lotteries. However, the median of the
CE was higher in the group with three alternative, 775 compared to 325 in
the group with two alternatives. The CE is significantly larger in the group
with three alternatives on the 1%-level (Wilcoxon-Test). 5 participants in
group 1 even chose CEs larger than 1.000 Euros. The result does not change,
however, if we exclude these 5 persons from the analysis.
Five participants in session 5 provided CEs larger than 10 Euro. These
choices seem rather extreme and were excluded from the analysis. Further-
more it has to be noted, that three participants provided larger values for
X if compared to lottery B than for lottery A. For purposes of this study
these participants were excluded from the analysis since the added alterna-
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Lotteries Median CE Median CE Significance
(2 Alternatives) (3Alternatives) (Wilcoxon-Test)
Paired Choices 300 400 1%-Level
Paired Choices (small) 5.00 7.00 5%-Level
7.60 5%-Level
Table 325 775 1%-Level
Table (small) 6.20 7.80 1%-Level
Table 2: Test on differences in median CE
tive was not dominated. Values for X were significantly higher (1%-level,
Wilcoxon-Test) in session 5 than in session 6.
For sessions 3 and 4 a different method of eliciting the CE was applied.
The median CE for the group with three alternatives is 400 and larger than
the median in the group with two alternatives with a median of 300. In
group 3 most of the participants never chose alternative B, which means
that these participants faced basically the same choice as participants in
group 4. However, the CE in group 3 is significantly larger than in group 4.
4 participants in group 3 preferred alternative B for small money values in
alternative C. Furthermore, 7 participants in group 4 indicated indifference
between the offered lotteries for small values in alternative C. The analysis
shows that the CE in group 3 for people who never choose the lottery 0.1,
5'000; 0.9, 0 is significantly larger than in group 4 on the 1%-level (Wilcoxon-
Test). Including the participants who indicate indifference between lotteries
A and B and those who preferred lottery B in some cases does not change
this result.
Session 9 represents a rather extreme case since the added alternative was
dominated by both alternatives. The risky choice offered a larger payoff with
higher probability and the sure payoff was larger than the positive outcome
of the lottery in alternative B. As expected none of the participants chose
this alternative. The result shows that by adding a third alternative that
is as clearly dominated as in this case, the median CE for the lottery in
alternative A is significantly larger than in the group with two alternatives
(Wilcoxon test, 5%-level).
4 Conclusion
The results reported show that introducing an alternative, that is dominated
and therefore not chosen by the participants can increase the CE of the dom-
inating alternative. For that reason, a range of choices between the domi-
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nating alternative and a sum of money participants reverse their preference
if the dominated alternative is added to the set of choices.
This violation of existing theory has implication in many business set-
tings. For example, when consultants present managers with options, it
might not always be useful to eliminate dominated alternatives before pre-
senting the decision maker with the facts. Furthermore, when financial con-
sultants advise private investors on how to invest money into pension funds,
thought has to be given on what options should be provided to the investor.
If adding a dominated alternative to the choice set alters the decision of the
investor, the risk structure of the portfolio changes once the alternative is
added. Therefore, the consultant cannot identify the real preference struc-
ture of the investor by offering different choice sets. The implication of the
violation of independence of dominated alternatives has been discussed al-
ready in (Arrow, 1951). Consequences have to be discussed for eliciting social
preferences, bargaining and choices under uncertainty.
For the elicitation of social preferences, a variety of methods have been
discussed in economic literature. Attention has been drawn on the possibility
of strategic voting (Myatt, 2007), where true preferences are not reflected,
to alter the overall outcome to one's favour. The result of this paper adds
another point to that discussion. Following these results the alternatives that
are presented do the decision makers are subject to strategy as whether a
dominated alternative is offered can affect the preferences of the individuals.
The same is true for bargaining situations. One can think of situations, where
offering the opponent something one knows the other side does not want can
alter the valuation of other items.
Prospect Theory is a powerful tool to explain a number of violations
of utility theory and is seemingly more promising to pursue in the future
than redefining utility theory (Camerer, 1998). The violation discussed in
this paper, however, cannot be explained by either theory. The weighting
of probabilities cannot explain this phenomenon since it does not explain
the evaluation of one prospect dependent on other alternatives. A simpler
and more intuitive model was proposed in form of regret theory (Bell, 1982)
(Loomes & Sugden, 1982) which became an axiomatic structure (Sugden,
1993). Although regret theory is applicable to decisions where prospects are
involved and explain phenomena like the reluctance of people to exchange
lottery tickets (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1996). However, regret theory implies in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives and cannot explain the violation found
in this paper.
The case-based decision theory (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1995) suggests
that the context in which a decision is made determines how preferences are
formed by individuals. However, it still does not explain the phenomenon dis-
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covered in this paper. According to that theory the third alternative might
alter the way how participants perceive the situation, but a difference of
preferences between the dominating alternatives are not accommodated.
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